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Abstract
Determining conclusively whether a new version of software
creatively exceeds a previous version or a third party sys-
tem is difficult, yet very important for scientific approaches
in Computational Creativity research. We argue that software
product and process need to be assessed simultaneously in
assessing progress, and we introduce a diagrammatic formal-
ism which exposes various timelines of creative acts in the
construction and execution of successive versions of artefact-
generating software. The formalism enables estimations of
progress or regress from system to system by comparing their
diagrams and assessing changes in quality, quantity and va-
riety of creative acts undertaken; audience perception of be-
haviours; and the quality of artefacts produced. We present
a case study in the building of evolutionary art systems, and
we use the formalism to highlight various issues in measuring
progress in the building of creative systems.
Introduction
Creativity, we believe, relates to a perception that others
have of certain behaviours exhibited by some person or sys-
tem, rather than an inherent property of people or software:
in this sense it is a secondary quality. Moreover, we believe
that, just as the endless debates about “is it art?” fuel innova-
tion in the arts, the endless debates about “is it creative?” are
a force for good: they drive forward creative practices and
Computational Creativity research. A longer discussion of
this philosophical position is given in (Colton et al. 2014),
and an exposition of creativity as being essentially contested
(Gallie 1956) is given in (Jordanous 2012).
In such a context of energetic and subjective debate about
creativity, it has been difficult to derive systematic ap-
proaches to assessing progress in the building of software
for creative purposes. One main issue has been the cross-
purposes of the creativity project(s) for which software is
developed. A useful analogy with the notions of weak and
strong AI has arisen recently in Computational Creativity re-
search. Focusing on software which generates artefacts such
as poems, paintings or games, we can say that weak Com-
putational Creativity objectives emphasise the production of
increasingly higher valued artefacts, whereas strong Compu-
tational Creativity objectives emphasise increasing the per-
ception of creativity people have of the system. This is sim-
ilar to the distinction put forward in (al-Rifaie and Bishop
2012). In many projects, there are both strong and weak ob-
jectives, and often they are not complementary. For instance,
increasing autonomy in software may lead simultaneously to
higher perception of creativity and lower value artefacts be-
ing produced. This is described as the latent heat problem
in (Colton and Wiggins 2012), and is analogous to U-shaped
learning, where to get better, we first have to get worse.
The objectives for a project usually influence the assess-
ment methods employed. In particular, to assess progress
with respect to weak objectives, it makes sense to evaluate
the quality of the artefacts produced. In contrast, for strong
objectives, it makes more sense to assess what software ac-
tually does and how and why people perceive it as creative
or not. To this end, in (Colton, Pease, and Charnley 2011)
we introduced the FACE descriptive model to formalise de-
scriptions of the creative acts undertaken by software, and
the IDEA model to formalise the impact those creative acts
might have on people. Subsequent attempts to use these
models to describe particular systems have highlighted an-
other major issue: the assignment of programmer/software
ownership of creative acts. Along with other issues in apply-
ing it to describe systems, we have found the FACE model
to be inadequate for fully capturing the interplay of creative
acts between programmer and program in this respect.
We describe here the next stage of our formalism for
capturing notions of progress in building creative systems.
We first provide a potted history of how progress has been
evaluated in Computational Creativity research, and lay out
some intuitive notions of progress. Given our philosophical
and practical standpoints, we place less emphasis on asking
whether artefacts are ‘better’ than previously. We also avoid
direct questions about ‘creativity’ in computational systems.
Instead, we integrate (i) aspects of the FACE and IDEA
models (ii) objective measures of quality, quantity and va-
riety of creative acts and (iii) audience perceptions of soft-
ware behaviour and quality of output. We present a two-
stage method for estimating whether obvious or potential
progress or regress has occurred when building a new sys-
tem. This involves diagrammatically capturing various time-
lines in the building and execution of a system, then com-
paring diagrams. We use the method to describe progress
of an evolutionary art system, leading to a general discus-
sion about how the approach could be used in practice. We
conclude by describing future directions for this formalism.
Background in Assessing Creative Progress
The assessment of progress in building creative systems has
been a bespoke and multi-faceted endeavour, driven by var-
ious, often opposing objectives ranging from understanding
human creativity to practical generation of artefacts to the
raising of philosophical questions. The majority of practical
researchers who engineer and test software joined the Com-
putational Creativity field with objectives in the weak sense
of getting software to produce quality artefacts. Hence the
first way in which progress was assessed was Boolean: if
software reliably produces artefacts of a particular type, then
this is progress over software which was unreliable or unable
to produce artefacts of the required form.
In such a context, Turing-style discrimination tests in-
dicated a particularly strong milestone: if certain artefacts
– usually hand-selected – looked/sounded so like human-
authored counterparts that observers couldn’t tell the dif-
ference, progress had certainly been made. This approach
was pioneered by (Pearce and Wiggins 2001) who were one
of the first to emphasise the importance and role of evalua-
tion in Computational Creativity, and to propose a concrete
way of applying Popperian falsificationism. However, de-
spite them urging caution at depending on the discrimination
test to evaluate creativity, direct comparison of human pro-
duced and computer generated artefacts has frequently been
used to assess progress. We further criticised such Turing-
style tests in Computational Creativity, for, among other rea-
sons, encouraging naı¨vety in software and the generation of
pastiches (Pease and Colton 2012). Moreover, we question
whether this methodology, while beneficial for short-term
scientific progress, is actually detrimental to the longer-term
goal of embedding creative software in society (Colton et
al. 2014). The work of (Ritchie 2007) was an important
step away from simplistic discrimination tests, establishing
an approach to assessing the value of artefacts according to
their novelty, typicality, and quality within a genre. A num-
ber of practitioners have used this approach to compare and
contrast their systems, e.g., (Pereira et al. 2005).
As the field matured, attention moved from mere genera-
tion to programs able to assess, critique and select from their
output. Often searching large spaces, software was required
to find the best artefacts using mathematically derived or
machine-learned aesthetic/utilitarian calculations (Wiggins
2006). If a later version of software – with more sophisti-
cated internal assessment techniques – was able to produce
higher yields of higher quality artefacts when assessed ex-
ternally, then clear progress had been made.
Audience perceptions of software became a focus, as the
field further matured. Jordanous used methods from linguis-
tics to determine how people are using the word ‘creativity’,
and which other concepts are associated with it, and then
used crowdsourcing techniques to evaluate a creative sys-
tem in terms of the associated concepts (Jordanous 2012).
As a complement to Jordanous’s work in which she tried to
capture society’s perception of creativity, researchers began
investigating ways to influence people’s perception of cre-
ativity in software. Software assessing its own work made
it appear more intelligent, and seem more creative. This led
to the engineering of software that framed its processes and
outputs by producing titles, commentaries and other mate-
rial. (Charnley, Pease, and Colton 2012) propose that this
may increase perception of creativity, and audiences would
possibly appreciate the artefacts produced more. Studying
audience perceptions of creativity in software opened many
research avenues, but raised an important problem: that the
original product-based assessment methods no longer cap-
ture all intuitions of what constitutes progress in the field.
From a strong perspective, some researchers, including
ourselves, are not content to accept the underlying assump-
tion of product-based evaluation methods: if better artefacts
are produced, the software must have been improved, hence
people will project higher perceptions of creativity onto the
software and progress will have been made. As mentioned
previously, the main problem here is that increasing auton-
omy – which must happen if strong objectives are to be met –
can decrease artefact value. Conversely, when the objectives
of a project are weak, it is perfectly natural to decrease soft-
ware autonomy to produce artefacts of presentation quality,
especially when a concert/exhibition is looming, but this is
unlikely to increase any perceptions of creativity.
Concentrating on understanding perceptions of software
creativity by the general public, we introduced the creativity
tripod in (Colton 2008b) as three types of behaviours which
were necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) for software
to avoid being labelled as ‘uncreative’. We proposed that
people are influenced by their understanding of what soft-
ware does when assessing its output. We argue that it is easy
to ascribe uncreativity to software which is not simultane-
ously seen as skillful, appreciative and imaginative.
Focusing on assessment of progress by peers, we intro-
duced the FACE and IDEA descriptive models in (Colton,
Pease, and Charnley 2011) and (Pease and Colton 2011).
The FACE model categorises generative acts by software
into those at (g)round level, during which base objects are
produced, and (p)rocess level, during which methods for
generating base objects are produced. These levels are sub-
divided by the types of objects/processes they produce: Fg
denotes a generative act producing some framing informa-
tion, Ag denotes an act producing an aesthetic measure, Cg
denotes an act producing a concept and Eg denotes an act
producing an example of a concept. Generative acts pro-
ducing new processes are defined accordingly as Fp, Ap,
Cp and Ep. Tuples of generative acts are compiled as cre-
ative acts, and various calculations and recommendations
are suggested in the model with which to compare creative
systems. We developed the IDEA model so that creative acts
and any impact they might have could be properly separated.
We defined various stages of software development and used
an ideal audience notion, where people are able to quantify
changes in well-being and the cognitive work required to ap-
preciate a creative act and the resulting artefact/process.
We have arrived at a very observer-centric situation in the
assessment of progress towards creative systems, in which
progress can only be measured using feedback from inde-
pendent observers about both the quality of artefacts pro-
duced and their perceptions of creativity in the software.
Unfortunately, the majority of researchers develop software
using only themselves as an evaluator, because observer-
based models are too time-consuming to use on a day-to-day
progress. These informal in-house evaluation techniques
generally do not capture the global aims of the research
project, or of the field (e.g. producing culturally important
artefacts and/or convincing people that software is acting in
a creative fashion). In many cases, systems are presented as
feats of engineering, with little or no evaluation at all (Jor-
danous 2012). We argue that assessing progress is inher-
ently a process-based problem. We focus here on modeling
diachronic change across multiple levels.
A Formal Assessment of Progress
We combine the most useful aspects of the IDEA and FACE
models, an enhanced creativity tripod, and aspects of assess-
ing artefact value into a diagrammatic formalism for evalu-
ating progress in the building of creative systems. We focus
on the creative acts that software performs, the artefacts it
produces and the way in which audiences perceive it and
consume its output. We simplify by assuming a develop-
ment model where a single person or team develops the soft-
ware, with various major points where the program is suffi-
ciently different for comparisons with previous versions. We
aim for the new formalism to be used on a daily basis with-
out audience evaluations, to determine short term progress,
but for it also to enable fuller audience-level evaluations at
the major development points. We also aim for the formal-
ism to help determine progress in projects where there are
both weak and strong objectives. We found that the original
FACE model didn’t enable us to properly express the pro-
cess of building and executing generative software. Hence
another consideration for our new model is that it can cap-
ture various timelines both in the development and the run-
ning of software in such a way that it is obvious where the
programmer contributed creatively and where the software
did likewise.
With the above aims in mind, we envisage a scenario
where we are comparing two versions of creative software
v1 and v2. At the highest level, we split the assessment
method into a two stage process as follows:
1. Diagrams are drawn for both v1 and v2 which capture the
interplay of programmer and program behaviours as time-
lines during both the development phase and the runtime ex-
ecution of both versions of the software.
2. The diagrams for v1 and v2 are compared by an audience
to determine if the second system represents progress over
the first in terms of process. Similarly, the output from v1
and v2 is compared, to see if progress has been made.
Stage 1: Diagrammatic Capture of Timelines
Taking a realistic but abstracted view of generative soft-
ware development and deployment, we identify four types
of timeline. Firstly, generative programs are developed in
system epochs, with new versions being regularly signed
off. Secondly, each process a program undertakes will have
been implemented during a development period where cre-
ative acts by programmer and program have interplayed.
(a)
< A1, A2 >
< G1,G2 >
< A1, A2 >
< A1, A2 >
< A1, A2 >
< A1, A2 >
α
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
< A1 >
β
< Cg >
< Eg >∗
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))]
P1
< Cg >
< Eg >∗
< Ag >
T (ag)
[S (ag(eg))]
P2
< Cp >∗
< Cg, Eg >∗ < Ag >
H1
< Cm >
< Cp >
[T (Cp)]
< Cg, Eg > < Ag >
H2
(b) (c)
Figure 1: (a) Key showing four types of timelines (b) Pro-
gression of a poetry system (c) Progression of the HR system.
Thirdly, at run-time, data will be passed from process to pro-
cess in series of creative and administrative subprocesses
performed by software and programmer. Finally, each sub-
process will comprise a sequence of generative or adminis-
trative acts. We capture these timelines diagrammatically,
highlighted with coloured arrows in Figure 1(a). The blue
arrow from box α to β represents a change in epoch at sys-
tem level. The red arrows overlapping a process stack rep-
resent causal development periods. The green arrows rep-
resent data being passed from one subprocess to another at
run-time. The brown arrows represent a series of genera-
tive/administrative acts which occur within a subprocess.
Inside each subprocess box is either a < creative act >
from the FACE model (i.e., a sequence of generative acts),
or an [ administrative act ] which doesn’t introduce any new
concept, example, aesthetic or framing information/method.
Administrative acts were not originally described in the
FACE model, but we needed them to describe certain pro-
gressions of software. For our purposes here, we use only
T to describe a translation administrative act often involving
programming, and S to describe when an aesthetic measure
is used to select the best from a set of artefacts. To add pre-
cision, we indicate the output from which generative act the
administrative routine is applied, and to which examples a
ground aesthetic is applied. To enable this, we employ the
FACE model usage of lower-case letters to denote the out-
put from the corresponding upper-case generative acts. We
extend the FACE notion of (g)round and (p)rocess level gen-
erative acts with (m)eta level acts during which process gen-
eration methods are invented. As in the original description
of the FACE model, we use bar notation to indicate that a
particular act was undertaken by the programmer. We use a
superscripted asterisk (∗) to point out repetition.
As a simple example diagram, Figure 1(b) shows the pro-
gression from poetry generator version P1 to P2. In the
first version, there are two process stacks, hence the system
works in two stages. In the first, the software produces some
example poems, and in the second the user chooses one of
the poems (to print out, say). The first stack represents two
timesteps in development, namely that (a) the programmer
had a creative act < Cg > whereby he/she came up with a
concept in the form of some code to generate poems, and
(b) the programmer ran the software to produce poems in
creative acts of the form < Eg >∗. The second stack repre-
sents the user coming up with an idea for an aesthetic, e.g.,
much rhyming, in creative act< Ag >, and then applying that
aesthetic ag him/herself to the examples, eg, produced by
the software, in the selection administrative act [S (ag(eg))],
which maps the aesthetic ag : {eg} → [0, 1] over the gen-
erated examples, and picks the best one. In the P2 version
of the software, the programmer undertakes translation act
[T (ag)], writing code that allows the program to apply the
rhyming aesthetic itself, which it does at the bottom of the
second stack in box P2.
Figure 1(c) shows a progression in the HR automated the-
ory formation system (Colton 2002) which took the software
to a meta-level, as described in (Colton 2001). HR operates
by applying production rules which invent concepts that cat-
egorise and describe input data. Each production rule was
invented by the programmer during creative acts of the type
< Cp >, then at run-time, HR uses the production rules to
invent concepts and examples of them in < Cg, Eg >∗ acts.
In the meta-HR version, during the < Cm > creative act,
the programmer had the idea of getting HR to form theories
about theories, and in doing so, generate concept-invention
processes (production rules) in acts of the form < Cp >. The
programmer took meta-HR’s output and translated [T (Cp)]
it into an implemented production rule that HR could use,
which it does at the bottom of the stack in box H2.
Stage 2: Comparing Diagrams and Output
In both simple cases of Figure 1, it is clear that progress
has been made in the strong sense, but not clear in the weak
sense, as the output could easily be degraded by the more so-
phisticated processing of the systems. The diagrams help us
to capture the creative interplay between software and pro-
grammer at design time and run time. However, given that
the ultimate aim of both strong and weak projects is to im-
press audiences with process and product, any assessment of
progress must be done in a context of audience evaluation.
However, as mentioned previously, audience evaluation is
too expensive to help assess progress on a day to day ba-
sis. Hence, it seems sensible for the programmer to step in
and act as a proxy for a perceived audience: we advocate the
programmer putting themselves in the position of the type of
person they would expect to form their audience, and answer
questions about the products and processes accordingly.
Examining the transition from one diagram to another
should provide some shortcuts to estimate audience reac-
tions, especially when there are strong project objectives.
In particular, as with the original FACE model, the diagrams
make it obvious where creative or administrative responsi-
bility has been handed over to software, namely where an
act which used to be barred has become unbarred, i.e., the
same type of generative act still occurs, but it is now per-
formed by software rather than programmer. This happened
when the S became an S in Figure 1(b) and when the Cp be-
came a Cp in Figure 1(c). At the very least in these cases, an
unbiased observer would be expected to project more auton-
omy onto the software, and so progress in the strong sense
has likely happened. In addition, the diagrams make it ob-
vious when software is doing more processing in the sense
of having more stacks, bigger stacks or larger tuples of acts
in the stack entries. Moreover, the diagrams make it clear
that more varied or higher-level creative acts are being per-
formed by the software – again, this was one of the benefits
of the original FACE model. Both of these have the potential
to convince audience members that software is being more
sophisticated with respect to various behaviours described
below, and hence can be a shorthand for progress.
When dealing with actual external evaluation, where peo-
ple don’t know what software does, we suggest that the di-
agrams above (and verbalisations/simplifications of them)
can be used to describe to audiences what the software and
what the programmer have done in a project. In this way, us-
ing also their judgements about the artefacts produced, peo-
ple can make fully informed decisions in evaluation studies.
As a general philosophical standpoint, we suggest not ask-
ing people if they believe software is behaving creatively,
but rather concentrating on whether they perceive the soft-
ware as acting uncreatively. Our argument for this is that the
concept of creativity is essentially contested (Gallie 1956),
hence, no matter how sophisticated our software gets, we
should not expect consensus on such matters. However,
we have found that people agree much more on notions of
uncreativity: if a program doesn’t exhibit behaviours onto
which certain words like intentionality can be projected,
then it is very easy to condemn it as being uncreative.
Hence, we advocate not asking a set of questions from
which we can conclude that an audience member thinks that
software is creative, but rather asking questions from which
we can determine whether they think that software is act-
ing uncreatively. It may seem like rather a negative admis-
sion, but we believe that the best way to get people to accept
software as being creative is for them to eventually realise
that there is no good reason to call it uncreative. Even then,
people would be perfectly at liberty to say that while soft-
ware is not uncreative, it is not creative either: creativity and
uncreativity do not appear to be exact opposites. With this
in mind, we have boiled down audience evaluation of be-
haviour to asking people whether they would project certain
words onto software in reaction to understanding what it did
in the context of a particular project. We then tentatively
conclude that they believe the software is uncreative if they
don’t project onto it some or all of these words, as originally
intended in the creativity tripod proposition (Colton 2008b).
In the five years since the introduction of the creativity tri-
pod, we have slowly added additional behaviours which we
have found to be important in the perception of creativity in
software. That is, for people to take seriously software as be-
ing not uncreative, we believe it needs to exhibit behaviours
onto which people can meaningfully project (at least) these
Product change Process change Weak Strong
Up Up OP OP
Up Down PP PR
Up Same OP PP
Down Up PR PP
Down Down OR OR
Down Same OR PR
Same Up PP OP
Same Down PR OR
Same Same PP PP
Table 1: Guidelines for using change in evaluation of
product and process in gauging (O)bvious or (P)otential
(P)rogress or (R)egress, in both weak and strong agendas.
eight words: skill, appreciation, imagination, learning, in-
tentionality, accountability, innovation, subjectivity and re-
flection. We have found that assessing the level of projec-
tion of these words onto the behaviours of software can help
us to gauge people’s opinions about (the lack of) important
higher-level aspects of software behaviour, such as auton-
omy, adaptability and self-awareness.
The method we suggest for estimating progress from ver-
sion v1 of a creative system to version v2 is to: (a) show
audience members the diagrams for v1 and v2 as above, and
explain the acts undertaken by the software, then (b) show
audience members the output from v1 and v2, and (c) ask
each person to compare the pair of product and process for
v1 with that of v2. A statistical analysis could then be used to
see whether the audience as a whole evaluates the output as
being better, worse or the same, and whether they think that
the processing is better, worse or the same in terms of the
software seeming less uncreative. This takes into account
the phenomenon described in (Colton 2008b) whereby the
process can influence value judgements for artefacts.
To use this analysis to estimate progress, it’s important to
first prioritise objectives for the project locally in terms of
strong and weak agendas. Then, taking the audience evalua-
tion of change in output and in process, we suggest using the
guidelines in Table 1. Here, we have stipulated that certain
evaluation pairs indicate obvious progression (OP) or obvi-
ous regression (OR). For instance, in the weak sense, when
the evaluation of output goes up and the evaluation of pro-
cess increases or stays the same, it seems clear to indicate
obvious progress. Other cases are not so clear-cut, for in-
stance when evaluation of artefacts goes up, but evaluation
of process goes down. In this case, we suggest that this is po-
tential progress (PP) in a weak agenda, and potential regress
(PR) in a strong agenda. In such cases, we give our judge-
ments for whether it is likely, after more development, that
v2 will be viewed retrospectively as a progressive success
or a step backwards. Note that we have tended to be opti-
mistic, e.g., when evaluation of output and process stay the
same, we say that this is potential progress in both weak and
strong agendas. Note also that this table is meant to be used
flexibly, possibly in a context of more fine grained analysis.
For instance, the focus of a subproject might be to increase
audience perception of intentionality, and if this increases
while audience perception of the value of the process as a
whole reduces, it should still be seen as progress.
A Case Study in Evolutionary Art
Evolutionary art – where software is evolved which can
generate abstract art – has been much studied within Com-
putational Creativity circles (Romero and Machado 2007).
Based on actual projects which we reference, we hypothe-
sise here the various timelines of progress that could lead
from a system with barely any autonomy to one with nearly
full autonomy. Figure 2 uses our diagrammatic approach
to capture three major lines of development, with the final
(hypothetical) system in box 8 representing finality, in the
strong sense that the software can do very little more cre-
atively in generating abstract art. Since features from ear-
lier system epochs are often present in later ones, we have
colour-coded individual creative acts as they are introduced,
so the reader can follow their usage through the systems.
If an element repeats with a slight variation (such as the
removal of a bar), this is highlighted. The figure includes
a key, which describes the most important creative and ad-
ministrative acts in the systems. Elements in the key are in-
dexed with a dot notation: system.process-stack.subprocess
(by number, from left to right, and top to bottom, respec-
tively). System diagrams have repetitive elements, so that
the timelines leading to its construction and what it does at
run-time can be read in a stand-alone fashion.
Following the first line of development, system 1 of Fig-
ure 2 represents an entry point for many evolutionary art
systems: the programmer invents (Cp) (or borrows) the con-
cept formation process of crossing over sets of mathematical
functions to produce offspring sets. He/she also has an idea
(Ep) for a wrapper routine which can use such a set of func-
tions to produce images. He/she then uses the program to
generate (Cg) a set of functions and employ the wrapper to
produce (Eg) an image which is sent to the (P)rinter. The
crossover and subsequent image generation is repeated mul-
tiple times in system 2, and then the programmer – who has
invented (Ag) their own aesthetic – chooses a single image to
print. In system 3, as in the poetry example above, the pro-
grammer translates their aesthetic into code so the program
can select images. This is a development similar to that for
the NEvAr system (Machado and Cardoso 2002).
Following the second line of development, in system 4,
the programmer selects multiple images using his/her own
aesthetic preferences, and these become the positives for a
machine learning exercise as in (Li et al. 2013). This enables
the automatic invention (Ag) of an aesthetic function, which
the programmer translates by hand T (ag) from the machine
learning system into the software, as in (Colton 2012), so the
program can employ the aesthetic without user intervention.
In system 5, more automation is added, with the program-
mer implementing their idea (Cm) of getting the software to
search for wrappers, then implementing this (Em), so that the
software can invent (Ep) new example generation processes
for the system.
Following the final line of development, in system 6, we
return to aesthetic generation. Here the programmer has the
idea (Ap) of getting software to mathematically invent fitness
functions, as we did in (Colton 2008a) for scene generation,
using the HR system (Colton 2002) together with The Paint-
< Cp, Ep >
< Cg, Eg > P
1
< Cp, Ep >
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))] P
2
< Cp, Ep >
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ag >
[T (ag)]
[S (ag(eg))] P
3
< Cp, Ep >
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))]
< Ag >
[T (ag)]
[S (ag(eg))] P
4
< Cp, Ep >
< Cm, Em >
< Ep > < Cg, Eg >∗
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))]
< Ag >
[T (ag)]
[S (ag(eg))] P
5
< Cp, Ep >
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ap >
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))] P
6
< Cm, Em >
<Cp,Ep>
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ap >
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))] P
7
< Cm, Em >
< Cm, Em >
< Cp >
< Ep >
< Cg, Eg >∗
< Ap >
< Ag >
[S (ag(eg))]
< Fp >
< Fg > P
8
ID Event Explanation
1.1.1 Cp The programmer invents the idea of crossing over two sets of mathematical functions to produce a new set of
mathematical functions.
1.1.1 Ep The programmer implements a wrapper method that takes a set of mathematical functions and applies them to
each (x, y) co-ordinate in an image to produce an RGB colour.
1.1.2 Cg The software generates a new set of functions by crossing over two pairs of functions.
1.1.2 Eg The software applies these functions to the (x, y) co-ordinates of an image, to produce a piece of abstract art.
2.2.1 Ag The programmer had in mind a particular aesthetic (symmetry) for the images.
2.2.2 S (ag(eg)) The programmer uses his/her aesthetic to select a preferred image for printing.
3.2.2 T (ag) The programmer took their aesthetic and turned it into code that can calculate a value for images.
3.2.3 S (ag(eg)) The software applies the aesthetic to select one of a set of images produced by crossover and the wrapper.
4.3.1 Ag The software uses machine learning techniques to approximage the programmer’s aesthetic.
4.3.2 T (ag) The programmer hand-translates the machine learned aesthetic into code.
4.3.3 S (ag(eg)) The software applies the new aesthetic to choosing the best image from those produced.
5.1.2 Cm The programmer has the idea of getting the software to search through a space of wrapper routines.
5.1.2 Em The programmer implements this idea.
5.1.3 Ep The software invents a new wrapper.
5.4.2 T (ag) The software translates the machine-learned aesthetic itself into code.
6.2.1 Ap The programmer has the idea of getting the software to invent a mathematical fitness function.
6.2.2 Ag The software invents a novel aesthetic function.
6.2.3 S (ag(eg)) The software selects the best artefact according to its aesthetic function.
7.1.1 Cm The programmer has the idea of getting the software to invent and utilise novel combination techniques for sets
of functions, generalising crossover.
7.1.1 Em The programmer implements this idea so that the software can invent new combination techniques.
7.1.2 Cp The software invents a novel combination technique.
8.4.1 Fp The programmer has the idea of getting the software to produce a commentary on its process and artwork by
describing its invention of a new aesthetic, combination method and wrapper.
8.4.2 Fg The software produces a commentary about its process and product.
Figure 2: The progression of an evolutionary art program through eight system epochs.
ing Fool (Colton 2012b). In system 7, the programmer re-
alises (Cm) that crossover is just one way to combine sets of
functions, and gives (Em) the software the ability to search
a space of combination methods (Cp). The software does
this, and uses the existing wrapper to turn the functions into
images. System 8 is the end of the line for the development
of the software, as it brings together all the innovations of
previous systems. The software invents aesthetic functions,
innovates with new concept formation methods that combine
mathematical functions, and generates new wrappers which
turn the functions into images. Finally, the programmer has
the idea (Fp) of getting the software to write commentaries,
as in (Colton, Goodwin, and Veale 2012), about its process-
ing and its results, which it does in generative act Fg.
Tracking how the system diagrams change can be used to
estimate how audiences might evaluate the change in pro-
cessing of the software, in terms of the extended creativity
tripod described above. Intuitively, each system represents
progress from the one preceding it, justified as follows:
1→ 2: < Cg, Eg >→< Cg, Eg >∗
Simple repetition means that the software has more skill,
and the introduction of independent user selection shouldn’t
change perceptions about autonomy.
2→ 3: S → S
By reducing user intervention in choosing images, the
software should appear to have more skill and autonomy.
1→ 4: Introduction of Ag and S (ag(eg)) acts
Machine learning enables the generation of novel aesthetics
(albeit derived from human choices), which should in-
crease perception of innovation, appreciation and learning,
involving more varied creative acts.
4→ 5: Introduction of an Ep act, T → T
Wrapper generation increases variety of creative acts, and
may increase perception of skill and imagination.
1→ 6: Introduction of Ag and S (ag(eg)) acts
The software has more variety of creative acts, and the
invention and deployment of its own aesthetic – this time,
without any programmer intervention – should increase
perception of intentionality in the software.
6→ 7: Introduction of a Cp act
Changes in the evolutionary processes should increase
perceptions of innovation and autonomy.
5, 7→ 8: Introduction of an Fg act
Framing its work should increase perceptions of account-
ability and reflection.
With all strands brought together, the programmer does
nothing at run-time and can contribute little more at design
time. The software exhibits behaviours onto which we can
meaningfully project words like skill, appreciation, innova-
tion, intentionality, reflection, accountability and learning,
which should raise impressions of autonomy, and make it
difficult to project uncreativity onto the software.
Discussion
Capturing what programmers and software do creatively
over long periods and during complicated program execu-
tions is difficult and open to variability. The systems in
the above case study could easily have been interpreted and
presented differently. In essence, we have provided some
tools for presenting software development in terms of cre-
ative acts, and suggested a mechanism for turning audience
perceptions into estimates of progress. We advise flexible
application in both cases. In particular, the difference be-
tween potential progress and potential regress is quite subtle.
Both mean that it is too early to determine whether progress
or regress has been made, and the programmer should pro-
ceed with caution: the former suggesting cautious optimism
and the latter, cautious pessimism. Practically speaking, the
programmer may want to review longer term goals, archive
previous versions, and/or clarify research directions.
Our approach is currently more tailored to capturing
progress in software behaviour than its output. We would
understand some resistance to the approach, particularly
from researchers with agendas for Computational Creativity
in the weak sense. For example, if product evaluations re-
main the same, yet processing evaluations go up, this is pre-
sumably because the software is performing more sophisti-
cated routines. From a weak perspective, the simpler version
of the software clearly has advantages, as it produces the
same results in a more understandable way. In certain appli-
cation domains, for instance mathematical discovery, where
aesthetics like truth are of paramount importance, a sim-
pler method for finding a result is usually preferred. While
reducing complexity of processing normally requires con-
siderable invention or intervention, unless such invention is
done by the software itself, the resulting simplicity would
tend to increase perceptions of uncreativity in software, re-
gardless (or, indeed, because of) how easy it is to understand
what it has done.
Our approach is also more tailored towards capturing
progress from version to version of the same software than to
comparing different programs. However, we have used the
formalism to compare systems in the same application do-
mains, such as mathematical discovery systems AM (Lenat
1976) and HR (Colton 2002), and various poetry and art gen-
erators. The comparative approach works somewhat here,
because it was possible to compare diagrams meaningfully
to suggest where one system would likely be perceived as an
improvement over the other. However, full application of the
approach may be difficult as the context for evaluating arte-
facts (and the processes producing them) can change greatly
with small changes in artefact composition. For instance, we
recently attempted to compare one-line “What if...?” ideas
produced textually by three systems. We found that it was
not possible to conceive a fair approach involving an au-
dience to determine which system’s artefacts or processes
were the best. Fields like Machine Learning have largely ho-
mogenised the testing of their systems in a problem-solving
paradigm. Given the tacit requirements for software to sur-
prise us through its output and processing, and to innovate
on many levels, it seems unlikely that such standardisation
could apply in Computational Creativity research.
Related Work
Diagrammatic approaches to software modelling have been
extensively studied in the last two decades. The best known
example is the Unified Modelling Language (UML), man-
aged by the Object Management Group (OMG), a stan-
dard that is widely used to visualize the design of systems
(www.omg.org/spec). The main objectives of modelling
with UML are to represent the architecture of a system, in-
cluding use cases, deployment, information flow diagrams,
etc., and to model system behaviour and data flow via activ-
ity diagrams, state machines, sequence diagrams, etc.
Progress at the process level can be modelled with UML
by diagramming the steps used to complete a task within the
system. However, UML is not typically applied to model
progress at the level of system epochs, although two UML
diagrams can of course be compared on the basis of the
functionality they describe. Some diagrams created using
the UML model, such as use case diagrams, enable design-
ers to specify the agents that participate in the development
of a system: people, external processes, other systems and
the system itself can all be modelled as agents. However,
there is no formal notation to distinguish between the dif-
ferent agents, rather, they are simply assigned a label which
is meaningful for the system designer. The OMG have also
developed other graphical notations specialised for other as-
pects of systems modelling. For instance, the Business Pro-
cess Model and Notation (BPMN) is used to model busi-
ness processes by extending the original activity diagrams
of UML. The specific objective of BPMN is to provide a
high-level overview of business systems, rather than detailed
information about how the system works.
UML diagrams have also been used in the context of for-
mal methods. In particular, the UML-B language (Said, But-
ler and Snook 2009) enables the modelling of Event-B spec-
ifications as UML-like diagrams. Event-B is a formalism
based on set theory for the modelling and verification of sys-
tems (Abrial 2010). One of the main aspects of Event-B is
the use of refinement to handle the complexity of systems at
different levels of abstraction. UML-B can be used to dia-
grammatically model a system at increasing levels of refine-
ment, and system consistency can then be verified through
mathematical proof. However, UML-B considers one sys-
tem at a time, so it is not possible to use this formalism to
model creative change as system development progresses.
Using the Event-B formalism, it is possible to model as-
pects of the environment, such as external systems that af-
fect the behaviour of the modelled system. The aim is to
ensure that the designed system will work in harmony with
its operating environment. However, there is no clear way to
delimit the aspects of the model that are related to the envi-
ronment and those that are part of the final system. Again,
the environment is simply identified by the designer assign-
ing meaningful names to the state representing it. Other re-
lated approaches include Z-notation (Spivey 1992), the Vi-
enna Development Method (Jones 1990) and the B-method
(Abrial 1996). The objective of these approaches is to verify
properties of systems. Progress would be meaningful at the
modelling level, i.e., by building models that offer increas-
ing detail (and assurance) about how a given system works.
Petri nets provide a graphical notation used primarily to
model systems with concurrency (Girault and Valk 2003).
With petri nets, progress at the process level is modelled in
the form of state transitions, and data is represented by ab-
stract tokens, with no data values assigned. An extension,
called coloured petri nets (Jensen and Kristensen 2009), al-
low data values to be assigned to tokens. Neither type of
petri net is used for modelling changes through versions of
a system. Petri nets are an event-based modelling language
and representations of agents (such as the programmer or the
system) are not included in the formalism.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a new diagrammatic formalism for as-
sessing progress in building creative systems. Our aims
were to enable more precise understanding of progress in
Computational Creativity in general, and in mapping the
progress of particular systems. In doing so, we aimed to
bring closer together public/peer appreciation of progress,
strong/weak agendas, and day-to-day/milestone progress as-
sessments. The new approach involves producing diagrams
of systems that depict creative acts in timelines, which are
compared in a context of audience evaluation of process and
product. When applied, the formalism captures some intu-
itive notions, including: quality of artefacts; quantity, level
and variety of creative acts performed; and audience percep-
tion of software behaviour. To enable better understanding
of process, and more informed audience judgements about
(un)creativity, the diagrams explicitly separate creative acts
coming from the programmer and the program. Even in the
absence of audience participation, the diagrams themselves
can be used in combination with straightforward assump-
tions about audience reactions to system design features to
perform low-cost estimates of progress in a strong agenda.
We motivated the approach throughout with various
philosophical standpoints, as per (Colton et al. 2014), sup-
ported by a critical review of the ways in which progress
in building creative systems has been measured historically.
To highlight the potential for the formalism, we presented
a case study where the progress through eight versions of
evolutionary art software was mapped and justified.
Our audience evaluation model is far from complete. We
plan to employ the criteria specified in (Ritchie 2007), for
more fine-grained evaluations of the quality, novelty and
typicality of artefacts. We will also import audience reflec-
tion evaluation schemes from the IDEA descriptive model,
e.g., change in well-being, cognitive effort and emotional
responses such as surprise and amusement. We have so far
used the diagrammatic approach to fully depict timelines in
the building of generative software producing mathematics,
visual art, poetry and video games, including dozens of sys-
tem diagrams (omitted for space reasons). This has worked
well, but there are still some subtle improvements required
to capture better the functioning of the software at run-time.
(Gabriel and Goldman 2000) describe system devel-
opment environments with many contributing program-
mers, and multiple interacting, self-programming, and self-
updating distributed systems (Gabriel and Goldman 2006).
It would be straightforward to modify our formalism to deal
with multiple agents, for example by turning bars into su-
perscripts. However, this does complicate the notion of
progress: if system µ chooses to hand off creative control to
system ν, this would amount to changing a superscript – but
it’s not immediately clear that this should count as progress
in the same way that removing bars does. If the agents are
considered to be full partners in the creative process, µ and
ν may well have their own perspectives on what counts as
progress, and this needs to be formalized.
Broadly speaking, we expect that the distinction between
strong and weak agendas will eventually disappear: in or-
der to produce higher quality artefacts, more sophisticated
systems involving behaviours perceived as creative will be
required, and audiences will expect to project notions of cre-
ativity onto software to fully appreciate its output. In such
a context, assessing processes and products simultaneously
will be important, and we hope versions of this diagram-
matic approach will enable this. In (Colton, Goodwin, and
Veale 2012), we used the FACE model as a driving force for
poetry generation software, rather than as a descriptive tool.
We hope that system developers will similarly begin to think
about their software in the above diagrammatic terms, in or-
der to suggest interesting new avenues for implementation.
Acknowledgements
This work has been supported by EPSRC grants EP/J004049
and EP/L00206X, and through EC funding for the project
COINVENT 611553 by FP7, the ICT theme, and the Future
Emerging Technologies FET programme. We would like to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
References
Abrial, J.-R. 1996 The B-Book – Assigning Programs to Meanings.
Cambridge University Press.
Abrial, J.-R. 2010. Modeling in Event-B – System and Software
Engineering. Cambridge University Press.
al-Rifaie, M and Bishop, M. 2012. Weak vs. strong Computational
Creativity, computing, philosophy and the question of bio-machine
hybrids. In Proceedings of the AISB Symposium on Computing and
Philosophy.
Charnley, J.; Pease, A.; and Colton, S. 2012. On the notion of
framing in Computational Creativity. In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Computational Creativity.
Colton, S., and Wiggins, G. 2012. Computational Creativity: The
final frontier? In Proceedings of the European Conference on AI.
Colton, S.; Cook, M.; Hepworth, R.; and Pease, A. 2014. On acid
drops and teardrops: Observer issues in Computational Creativity.
In Proceedings of the AISB Symposium on AI and Philosophy.
Colton, S.; Goodwin, J.; and Veale, T. 2012. Full-FACE po-
etry generation. In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Computational Creativity.
Colton, S.; Pease, A.; and Charnley, J. 2011. Computational Cre-
ativity Theory: The FACE and IDEA descriptive models. In Pro-
ceedings of the Int. Conference on Computational Creativity.
Colton, S. 2001. Experiments in meta-theory formation. In Pro-
ceedings of the AISB’01 Symposium on AI and Creativity in Arts
and Science.
Colton, S. 2002. Automated Theory Formation in Pure Mathemat-
ics. Springer.
Colton, S. 2008a. Automatic invention of fitness functions with
application to scene generation. In Proceedings of EvoMusArt.
Colton, S. 2008b. Creativity versus the perception of creativity in
computational systems. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Sym-
posium on Creative Intelligent Systems.
Colton, S. 2012. Evolving a library of artistic scene descriptors. In
Proceedings of EvoMusArt.
Colton, S. 2012b. The Painting Fool: Stories from building an
automated painter. In McCormack, J., and d’Inverno, M., eds.,
Computers and Creativity. Springer.
Gabriel, R. P. and Goldman, R. 2000. Mob software: The erotic
life of code. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Object-
Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and Applications.
Gabriel, R. P. and Goldman R. 2006. Conscientious software. In
ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 41.
Gallie, W. 1956. Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 56.
Girault, C. and Valk, R. 2003. Petri nets for systems engineerings
– a guide to modeling, verification, and applications. Springer.
Jensen, K. and Kristensen, L. M. 2009. Coloured Petri Nets -
Modelling and Validation of Concurrent Systems. Springer.
Jones, C. B. 1990. Systematic software development using VDM.
Prentice Hall.
Jordanous, A. 2012. A Standardised Procedure for Evaluating
Creative Systems: Computational Creativity Evaluation Based on
What it is to be Creative. Cognitive Computation 4(3).
Jordanous, A. 2012. Evaluating Computational Creativity: A Stan-
dardised Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems and its Appli-
cation. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Sussex.
Lenat, D. 1976. AM: An Artificial Intelligence approach to discov-
ery in mathematics. Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University.
Li, Y.; Hu, C.; Minku, L.; and Zuo, H. 2013. Learning aesthetic
judgements in evolutionary art systems. GPEM 14(3).
Machado, P., and Cardoso, A. 2002. All the truth about NEvAr.
Applied Intelligence 16(2).
Pearce, M. T. and Wiggins, G. A. 2001. Towards a Framework
for the Evaluation of Machine Composition. In Proceedings of the
AISB’01 Symposium on AI and Creativity in Arts and Science.
Pease, A., and Colton, S. 2011. Computational Creativity Theory:
Inspirations behind the FACE and IDEA models. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Computational Creativity.
Pease, A., and Colton, S. 2012. On impact and evaluation in Com-
putational Creativity: A discussion of the Turing test and an alter-
native proposal. In Proceedings of the AISB symposium on AI and
Philosophy.
Pereira, F.; Gerva´s, P.; and Cardoso, A. 2005. Experiments with
assessment of creative systems: An application of Ritchie’s criteria.
In Proceedings of the IJCAI Computational Creativity Workshop.
Ritchie, G. 2007. Some empirical criteria for attributing creativity
to a computer program. Minds and Machines 17.
Romero, J., and Machado, P., eds. 2007. The Art of Artificial
Evolution: A Handbook on Evolutionary Art and Music. Springer.
Wiggins, G. A. 2006. Searching for computational creativity. New
Generation Computing 24(3).
Said, M. Y., Butler, M. J., and Snook, C. F. 2009. Language and
tool support for class and state machine refinement in UML-B. In
Proceedings of the 2nd World Congress on Formal Methods.
Spivey, M. 1992. The Z notation: A reference manual. Prentice
Hall.
